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LOVE IN VAIN:
THE SOCIAL VALUE OF MISSISSIPPI'S ALIENATION OF
AFFECTION IN PROTECTING MARRIAGE
David Neil McCarty*
"Yeah, I followed her to the station with a suitcase in my hand
Well, it's hard to tell, it's hard to tell, but all my love's in vain."'
Mississippi is one of six states that recognizes the common law tort of
alienation of affection. This "heart balm" tort is a unique cause of action
that exists to compensate a spouse when a relationship has been damaged
by another. Alienation of affection protects marriage from everything
from text-messaging boyfriends to overbearing fathers-in-law.
The very nature of the tort involves the most personal and private
parts of our society-our emotions, our sexual lives, and the complex ma-
chinery of a marriage. For years, litigants lobbied for the eradication of the
tort based on a variety of arguments, ranging from its patriarchal origins to
the difficulty of assessing monetary damages to the inherent ickiness of dis-
cussing broken relationships on the stand. However, the tort is only one
feature of Mississippi's century-old efforts at protecting marriage. Recent
rulings from the Mississippi Supreme Court make clear that the tort is here
to stay and is evolving to meet the digital contours of the twenty-first
century.
Recognizing that it is not in danger of being abolished, it is important
for practitioners and the bench to understand the history of the tort, its
broad nature, and to recognize the legal pitfalls that might derail a claim.
I. Mississippi's HISTORICAL ATrEMPTS AT
VALUING MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY
To understand why alienation of affection exists today in Mississippi,
one must first examine how the legislature and the courts have approached
marriage and sexuality-both as a concept and a contract that might be
regulated.
The state has uniquely regulated a very specific type of contract-the
marriage relationship. The high value Mississippi places on marriage can
be seen through its strict regulation of how parties may contract for mar-
riage and later dissolve that same contract. First, the parties must register
with the state.2 They must meet certain age requirements.' They must wait
* The author is a solo practitioner in Jackson, Mississippi. He is a 2004 graduate of Mississippi
College School of Law.
1. ROBERT JOHNSON, Love in Vain, on 2 KING OF THE DELTA BLUES SINGERS (Columbia
Records 1970).
2. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(a) (1972).
107
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
three days after registration with the state before they attempt to enter into
the marriage contract, during which the public is open to inspect the pro-
posed contract.' Further, while many service contracts might require a
healthy contractee, the marriage contract specifically requires that the par-
ties are certified free of syphilis.' While the certification is certainly impor-
tant in and of itself, it also serves as a further delay to the parties to
contracting, as the statute requires that the hopeful parties obtain it at least
thirty days prior to registering to contract.6
The state also governs the circumstances which allow the contract to
be dissolved either unilaterally or bilaterally. There are twelve fault-based
grounds for divorce in Mississippi, which range from "natural impotency"
to "habitual drunkenness" to "marriage to some other person at the time of
the purported marriage."' "The most commonly used grounds for divorce
are adultery, desertion, and habitual, cruel, and inhuman treatment."8
Even though Mississippi now allows a no-fault divorce,9 it "does not permit
true unilateral no-fault divorce, since both spouses must agree" to it."o
Even the bilateral agreement to terminate the contract is strictly regu-
lated. Even when both parties are in agreement the marriage contract
should terminate, they are still required to seek court approval." The state
also places a "waiting period" in effect so that it will not allow the contract
to terminate before sixty days after the parties have sought court ap-
proval.12 Even then, a court could deny the petition to terminate the con-
tract if certain custody or child-support matters were not yet resolved.' 3
Ignoring rhetoric or political analysis, many moons ago the Mississippi
legislature also affirmatively placed a value on sex as a commodity, espe-
cially virginity, and allowed parents a civil process to recover for the loss of
their children's chastity or for women to recover for the loss of virginity
through "improper" means.14
A still-extant statute allows that "[a] parent may bring an action for
the seduction of a child, although such child be not living with nor in the
service of the plaintiff, and though there be no loss of service; but a recov-
ery by the parent or child shall bar any other action for the same cause."'
3. Id. § 93-1-5(a), (d).
4. Id. § 93-1-5(b).
5. Id. § 93-1-5(e).
6. Id. Effective July 1, 2012, section 93-1-5 will be amended to remove the requirements for a
three-day waiting period and a syphilis test. S. 2851, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012) (enacted).
7. Deborah H. Bell, Divorce & Domestic Relations, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Mississippi LAw § 28:1
(Jeffrey Jackson & Mary Miller eds., 2001).
8. Id.
9. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (1972).
10. Bell, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MississipiI LAw § 28:1 at n.1.
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(1).
12. Id. § 93-5-2(4).
13. Id. § 93-5-2(3).
14. It is beyond the reach of this article to address the complex nature of the word "virginity," or
the physical concept attached to it, but all efforts have been made to discard antiquated language his-
torically associated with the concept.
15. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-11 (1972).
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Similarly, "[a]n unmarried female may prosecute an action for her own se-
duction, and recover damages."1 6 The state even went so far to criminalize
seduction-especially if it occurred because of a fake marriage."
While there are no reported cases where an unmarried female filed
suit for her own seduction, one case does address a wrathful parent filing
suit against his daughter's paramour. In a case from 1929, a preacher with
a wife and family approached a young churchgoer in the congregation.'
Lillie Bang was between the age of sixteen and seventeen. 19 Preacher J.B.
Stone told the young woman that he was leaving his Jackson County church
and moving away, and that he wanted her to go with him.20 In grand tradi-
tion, he "assured her that she would have a better time with him than at
home; that he promised her everything she wanted; that he would buy her
all sorts of things, all the clothes she wanted and a car .... "21
Eventually the preacher convinced Lillie to leave with him, and they
traveled to Mobile and later lived in New Orleans.2 2 The young woman
testified that "as a result of persuasion, she submitted to sexual inter-
course." 23 While the details of how the affair ended were not summarized
by the court, it did note that the preacher "was brought to Pascagoula
under arrest." 24
Ed Bang, Lillie's father, filed suit against preacher Stone for Lillie's
seduction, and claimed he suffered great distress from the preacher's ac-
tions towards his daughter. 25  The preacher Stone declined to take the
stand himself, but did put on a witness "who testified that, shortly before
the alleged seduction, he saw Lillie, and a young man together, between
sundown and dark, near a barn in the old ship yard."26 The jury awarded
Lillie's father $2,000 2 7-or about $26,000 in 2011 dollars.2 8
16. Id. § 11-7-9.
17. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-55 (1972) provides that "[i]f any person shall obtain carnal knowl-
edge of any woman, or female child, over the age of eighteen years, of previous chaste character, by
virtue of any feigned or pretended marriage or any false or feigned promise of marriage, he shall, upon
conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than five years; but the testimony of the female
seduced, alone, shall not be sufficient to warrant a conviction." (emphasis added). The statute there-
fore allows a woman who was previously a virgin to recover if she was defrauded into sexual intercourse
with a man who offered or provided a real or fake marriage.
While the line of reported cases citing the statute ends in 1959, the statute has not been repealed.
While the tort is clearly a relic of earlier times, it did serve a purpose with at least some societal value,
as these "[c]riminal seduction statutes are one of the oldest types of statutory law prohibiting the com-
mission of sexual intercourse based upon some form of fraud." Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and
Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 116 (Spring 1998). Implicit in this statute's existence and
continued viability is that the State itself places such a value on a woman's virginity that it will criminal-
ize deceit that encroaches on virginity.
18. Stone v. Bang, 122 So. 95 (Miss. 1929).
19. Id. at 95.
20. Id. at 95-96.
21. Id. at 96.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 97.
25. Id. at 95-96.
26. Id. at 96.
27. Id. at 95.
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The court explicitly attached a property right to the father's interest in
his family. As the court put it, "We think a fair interpretation of the lan-
guage of the declaration is that both mental anguish and loss of services of
his daughter were relied on as elements of damages."2 9 Relying on lan-
guage from an 1872 case, it reasoned "[t]hat system of jurisprudence which
punishes in damages the slightest aggression upon property, but denies re-
dress to the father, and if he be dead, to the mother, for the defilement of
an infant daughter (except upon the predicate of a loss of services), is at
variance with the sentiments and conscience of this age." 30 Accordingly,
"[i]f the whole scheme of life is broken up by the stain of dishonor put
upon the daughter by her seducer, there is an unlawful interference with
the relationship of father and daughter.""
Yet in this patently patriarchal scheme, there was a glimmer of equal-
ity. First, the 1929 court declared that "courts cannot stand still," and
should evolve to fit the modern world: "Jurisprudence must expand its
principles, and their applications, so as to keep in harmony with the neces-
sities of advancing society."3 2
The preacher argued that he was entitled to an instruction that if Lillie
had given into his advances because she actually wanted a new car, or
clothes, or money, then he had not actually seduced her.3 3 The court re-
jected this premise, and ruled that "[s]eduction is not confined to love-mak-
ing and false promises alone, but may be brought about by promises, on the
part of the seducer, of a reward to the female seduced."3 4 Conjoined with
this reasoning, the court rejected preacher Stone's spongy evidence that
Lillie wasn't previously "chaste," referring to the gossip that she'd been
"near a barn in the old ship yard" with a young man." This was not strong
evidence that she wasn't chaste, the court reasoned.36
While the question of a chastity prerequisite was not reached, there
were hints of something more by the court." Read in light of the declara-
tion that courts should evolve with society, there are strong undercurrents
in Stone v. Bang that a civil claim for seduction did not have to include
sexual intercourse and did not require virginity as a prerequisite. The case
also provides a resounding decision that interference with a family could
support a claim for mental anguish.
Stone is the only case citing the "parent's rights" seduction statute in
the decades since its creation, and it is possible another might never occur.
28. Valuation based from the Consumer Price Index, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
29. Stone, 122 So. at 97.
30. Id. at 96-97.
31. Id. at 96.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 97.






Yet Stone remains a useful signifier of how Mississippi has historically
treated interference with families.
Nor was Stone authored in a vacuum. For decades the courts had al-
ready addressed interference with marriages, specifically when overbearing
families intruded upon the relationship between a husband and wife, or a
partner had committed adultery. Until 1992, Mississippi recognized the
common law tort of "criminal conversation," which allowed a spouse to
recover against a third party for adultery with their spouse." "The right
protected [was] the exclusive right of one spouse to sexual intercourse with
the other."" The tort was "strict liability" in nature-if adultery occurred,
the tort was complete.40 "The only defenses to these actions appear to be
the consent of the plaintiff and the statute of limitations."4 1
However, criminal conversation was rooted in outdated policy where
the "husband was regarded as having a property right in the body of his
wife and an exclusive right to the personal enjoyment of her."4 2  "The
wife's adultery was therefore considered to be an invasion of the husband's
property rights."4 3 As a result, the supreme court did not hesitate to abol-
ish it.44
Echoing the 1929 case of Stone v. Bang, in abolishing the common law
tort of criminal conversation the court held that "[t]he common law is not
static," for "[w]hat the court gives it can take away."4
II. ALIENATION OF AFFECTION: THE COMMON
LAw's SAFEGUARD OF MARRIAGE
Faced with the abolishment of criminal conversation and the decline of
seduction as a cause of action, the common law was left with one arrow in
its quiver to protect marriage: alienation of affection.
The first reported alienation of affections case rears its head in 1896,
although it is clear from the text of the case that the tort was known even
before that date.46
38. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Miss. 1992).
39. Id. (quoting Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Iowa 1978)).
40. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
43. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1219.
46. The state supreme court has correctly noted that the tort "was recognized in Mississippi as
early as 1926," although it errs to the extent that it suggests that is the earliest recognition of the tort by
the state courts. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1018 (Miss. 2007) (citing McRae v. Robinson, 145
Miss. 191, 110 So. 504 (1926)). A close reading of the 1926 McRae case shows repeated reliance upon
the Tucker case from 1896, discussed infra at note 47; see also Sivley v. Sivley, 96 Miss. 134, 50 So. 552
(Miss. 1909) (while the appeal did not address the merits of the tort, the underlying suit involved a tort
claim by a wife against her mother-in-law for alienation of affection from husband).
The Fitch court was not alone at setting the date in the 1920's; fifteen years before Fitch the court
had estimated the first recognition of the tort as 1927. See Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1218.
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In Tucker v. Tucker, a woman sued her father-in-law, alleging that he
caused her husband to abandon her.4 7 A jury had ruled in Ada Tucker's
favor, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed.48 The court disfavored
the jury instructions which "put the father upon the footing of a stranger
who intervenes between husband and wife," without acknowledging that a
parent might have a larger concern for a child.4 9 "The question always
must be, was the father moved by malice, or was he moved by proper pa-
rental motives for the welfare and happiness of his child?" 0 In what was
conceded to be a question of first impression, the trial court had instead
"misconceived the liability of the parent, and held him to the rigid account-
ability imposed upon strangers who invade the domestic circle and separate
husband and wife."s" This dicta hints that the latter rule regarding damage
to a marriage by strangers was already well established and recognized as a
tort by 1896, at the time of Tucker's decision.
Implicit in Tucker is that Ada actually had a cognizable interest in her
marriage, or her husband's affection, that was subject to protection by the
civil justice system. While Tucker uses the phrase "alienation of affec-
tions," as do all later cases, it is clear that what motivated Ada Tucker was
the damage done to her marriage by her father-in-law. She filed a civil suit
to protect her property right in a marriage. While the court reversed the
verdict she obtained, it did remand the case for a new trial below, and did
not prohibit Ada's suit against her father-in-law. 5 2
Over a century later Tucker may seem elementary, but in 1897 al-
lowing a woman to sue a man over a purely abstract property right was a
hallmark of equality. Yet this was not an outlier in Mississippi, as the
state's constitutional and statutory scheme was already progressive regard-
ing women's property rights. In 1839, Mississippi abolished coverture,
which allowed women to retain their own property irrespective of their
husband's demands or desires,53 and the 1890 Constitution specifically de-
clared that "[t]he legislature shall never create by law any distinction be-
tween the rights of men and women to acquire, own, enjoy, and dispose of
property of all kinds, or their power to contract in reference thereto."5 4 In
addition to the "woman's law," as the abolishment of coverture was re-
ferred to,5 5 a wife was permitted to sue her husband, 56 and a husband was
47. Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93, 19 So. 955 (Miss. 1896). The Westlaw version of the case does
not include information in the original reporter, but viewing the actual volume or PDF of the opinion
reveals details of the facts of the case.
48. Id. at 955-56.




53. Now codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1972), coverture was abolished via Chapter 34,
Articles 4 and 7, Hutchinson's Mississippi Code.
54. Miss. CONSr. art. IV, § 94; see Willis v. Gattman, 53 Miss. 721 (Miss. 1876) (money of wife's
obtained or transmitted after 1839 was "her separate property").
55. See McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So. 2d 256, 263 (Miss. 1978) (overruled on separate
grounds other than this terminology).
56. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-3 (1972).
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not allowed to rent his wife's property or carry on business with her prop-
erty without her receiving the proceeds of the business." Barely a decade
after Tucker, a 1909 case discussed a massive jury verdict in favor of a wo-
man who alleged her mother-in-law had harmed her marriage. While the
issue on appeal in Sivley v. Sivley was not the merits of an alienation of
affection claim, the reporter made clear that the young wife had sued her
mother-in-law for intruding upon her marriage." She had also obtained an
enormous $30,000 judgment against her husband's mother"-in today's
economy, about $700,000.60
Contrast that large verdict for a "family intrusion" alienation case in
1909 with the first reported alienation of affection case where the third
party that intruded on the marriage was an actual affair, and not a nosy
family member. 6 1 The facts in Brister v. Dunaway are extreme by even
today's standards: the alleged paramour "admitted, in his testimony, that
before the appellee and his wife were divorced the appellant often had
carnal knowledge of appellee's wife, resulting in a child being born to
them." 62 Despite the confession, the jury only returned a verdict of $2,000,
or about $26,000 in 2011 money.63
Clearly, the early alienation and seduction cases, coupled with a re-
view of contemporaneous statutes, demonstrate that Mississippi had sev-
eral active concerns. First, marriage would be protected from third party
intrusion, regardless of the nature. Second, the sexuality of women was
also accorded civil and criminal protections. Third, women had the same
property right in a marriage and right to protect it as did a man. Fourth,
although there is not much data available from the cases at the time, it
seems that juries were much more willing to compensate a "family intru-
sion" alienation case over a claim for alienation due to affair or for
seduction.
III. THE MODERN TORT AND ITS REQUIREMENTS
Alienation of affection remains a common law tort in Mississippi, and
its components have not radically changed over the decades. The elements
57. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-7 (1972). Despite this progressive approach to legal property rights,
Mississippi remained steadfast against extending the suffrage to women in the state, and Mississippi
women only obtained that right via the Nineteenth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX, § 1.
58. Sivley v. Sivley, 50 So. 552, 553 (Miss. 1909). After a year's separation, the couple later
reconciled and moved away from the intrusive parent to Memphis. Id.
59. Id. at 552,
60. Valuation is based on an estimate from the Consumer Price Index, found at http://
www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012), which only runs to 1913. Con-
trast this alienation of affection verdict with the $2,000 verdict for seduction a few years later in Stone v.
Bang, 122 So. 95 (Miss. 1929). Although without more data any conclusion is mere inference, the two
juries in the two cases clearly valued the woman's property right in her marriage much more highly than
a father's property right in his daughter's sexuality.
61. Brister v. Dunaway, 115 So. 36, 37 (Miss. 1927).
62. Id. at 38.
63. Id.
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are (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consor-
tium; and (3) causal connection between such conduct and loss. 6 4 To prove
a case, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that there was a direct interfer-
ence on the defendant's part sufficient enough to satisfy the jury that the
defendant caused the alienation of a spouse's affections.65 One must prove
that the third party's interference damaged the marriage6 6 by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.67
While the tort is often synonymous nowadays with adultery, its inten-
tions are much broader-to protect the marriage itself, which could be sub-
ject to attacks from several different corners. 68  Adultery is only one
weapon that might attack a union.69 Therefore, "[a] claim for alienation of
affections does not require that the plaintiff prove an adulterous relation-
ship."o As the court of appeals has emphasized, an "affair itself is not the
harm," but instead "the injury is the detrimental change in the marriage
relationship."7 1
That ruling is in accord with the many early decisions which protected
a marriage from unwanted third party intrusion of a non-sexual nature.7 2
"Family intrusion" cases are certainly still viable as alienation cases, but it
64. Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1025 (Miss. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Gorman v. McMahon, 792 So. 2d 307, 313 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
66. Id.; see also Martin v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 149 So. 2d 344, 347-48 (Miss. 1963) ("In order to sustain
a suit for alienation of affections, it must appear that there has been a direct interference on the part of
defendant sufficient to satisfy the jury of alienation of affections, and the burden of proof is on plaintiff
to establish such interference.").
67. Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 626 (Miss. 2008).
68. In one alienation of affection case, the court was moved to almost poetic heights in its de-
fense of the marriage contract. Justice McGowen, writing for the supreme court in 1932 declared:
So long as a husband and wife are living together, strangers who interfere with their marital
relations, even though the domestic relation has become strained, must know that they cannot
accept propositions which lead to the dissolution of the matrimonial tie. The injured spouse
has a right to use diplomacy and tact in order to win back waning affection, and affect a
reconciliation, on the theory so aptly expressed in the old camp meeting hymn: 'While the
lamp holds out to burn, the vilest sinner may return.' Waning affection may be revived, or at
least there is a possibility of it, so long as the marital tie remains undissolved.
Stanton v. Cox, 139 So. 458, 461 (Miss. 1932).
69. As noted above, Mississippi formerly recognized a tort that compensated "victims" of adul-
tery-the strict liability cause of action of "criminal conversation." Criminal conversation was judicially
abolished in 1992, ostensibly on the grounds that it no longer served society. Saunders v. Alford, 607
So. 2d 1214, 1218 (Miss. 1992).
70. Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 417 (Miss. 1999). It is critical to note that, unlike criminal
conversation, alienation of affection does not sound in strict liability. Indeed, in abolishing criminal
conversation, the court was clear that one reason it had outlived its usefulness was that it was
"[dletached . . . from an actual injury to the marital relation," and so "criminal conversation requires no
actual injury at all." Saunders, 607 So. 2d at 1218. Instead, it was "born of the notion that the cuckold
spouse is presumptively injured, or the notion that the spouse has some property interest in the chastity
of the other." Id. at 1218-19. The aims of alienation of affection are inherently broader and less base
than those of criminal conversation.
71. Fulkerson v. Odom, 53 So. 3d 849, 853 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
72. There are six such cases. In addition to Tucker and Sivley, discussed supra, see Martin v. Ill.
Cent. R.R., 149 So. 2d 344, 345 (Miss. 1963) (suit by wife against husband's family members); Halloway
v. Halloway, 198 So. 738, 738 (Miss. 1940) (suit by wife against sisters of husband); Nash v. Mobile & 0.
R.R., 116 So. 100, 101 (Miss. 1928) (suit by wife against railroad for husband's hearing loss); McRae v.
Robinson, 110 So. 504, 505 (Miss. 1926) (suit by husband against wife's family).
114 [VOL. 31:107
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is worth noting that the majority of recent reported cases since 1969 involve
physical contact between a third party and a spouse. 3
The statute of limitations for alienation cases is three years-a time
period which is not subject to the discovery rule, as the damage to the mar-
riage is expected to be experienced immediately.74 An alienation of affec-
tion claim can be maintained against an individual or a corporation.
73. There are over a dozen cases involving allegations of adultery or physical contact: Pierce v.
Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 615 (Miss. 2008) (adulterous affair, with divorce for uncondoned adultery, and
with paramours later marrying); Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012, 1015-16 (Miss. 2007) (admitted
adultery); Children's Med. Grp., P.A. v. Phillips, 940 So. 2d 931, 933 (Miss. 2006) (affair between co-
workers); Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1999) (after confession to wife that he had a pregnant
girlfriend, wife divorced him, and husband filed suit against her paramour); Saunders v. Alford, 607 So.
2d 1214, 1215 (Miss. 1992) (sexual relationship spanning over twenty years); Kirk v. Koch, 607 So. 2d
1220, 1221 (Miss. 1992) (cohabitation); Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Miss. 1990) (alleged
fornication); In re Knapp, 536 So. 2d 1330, 1332 (Miss. 1988) (alleged adultery); Camp v. Roberts, 462
So. 2d 726, 727 (Miss. 1985) (alleged adultery); Sipe v. Farmer; 398 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Miss. 1981)
(alleged kissing and adultery); Walter v. Wilson, 228 So. 2d 597, 598 (Miss. 1969) (evidence showed
adultery); Stanton v. Cox, 139 So. 458, 459 (Miss. 1932) (evidence of adultery by a woman shown by
physical visits, over two hundred letters and telegrams, and bills for roses, as well as an engagement
between the husband and defendant before he was divorced from the plaintiff); Brister v. Dunaway,
115 So. 36, 37 (Miss. 1927) (admission that man had "carnally known the appellee's wife," resulting in a
child); Hancock v. Watson, 962 So. 2d 627, 628-29 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (divorce after adulterous
affair); Gorman v. McMahon, 792 So. 2d 307, 311 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (admitted sexual relationship);
Carr v. Carr, 784 So. 2d 227, 228 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (wife filed suit against a woman after she took
up with her husband after he obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic and later married his
girlfriend in Las Vegas).
74. Fulkerson v. Odom, 53 So. 3d 849, 853 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). The court was clear that
"[a]lthough a clandestine affair is a secretive wrongdoing, it is not unrealistic to expect a plaintiff to
perceive, at the time of the affair, the resulting harm-the loss of consortium through alienation of the
spouse's affection." Id. at 852-53. "Because the injury is the detrimental change in the marriage rela-
tionship, it is reasonable for a spouse to discover the change in the marriage as it occurs." Id. at 853.
75. Children's Medical Group, P.A. v. Phillips, 940 So. 2d 931, 933-35 (Miss. 2006); Martin v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 149 So. 2d 344, 348 (Miss. 1963). In Martin, a woman sued her husband's employer, a
railroad, for alienation of affections. Martin, 149 So. 2d at 346-47. She argued that after her husband
suffered an injury the railroad conspired to deprive her of his affections, barred her from the hospital
where he was recovering, and that the railroad was requiring the husband to divorce her to settle for his
injuries. Id.
The case went to trial, and the jury found in favor of the railroad. Id. at 347. On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed that finding. Id. Ultimately the testimony in favor of the wife used "to estab-
lish alienation of affections was in direct conflict with the testimony of the various defendants, and it is
within the province of the trial jury to determine the weight and worth of the testimony to pass upon
contradictions in the evidence, and credibility of witnesses." Id. at 348.
Martin makes clear that an individual in Mississippi might sue a corporation for alienation of affec-
tion, but like a suit against another individual, must simply prove their case. That rule was reaffirmed
by the Children's Medical Group decision in 2006. In that case, a husband filed suit against his wife's
co-worker and their employer for alienation of affection. Children's Medical Group, 940 So. 2d at 933.
The company sought a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Id. On appeal, the supreme
court upheld the trial court, ruling that to succeed on a motion to dismiss the company "must demon-
strate that [the husband] cannot prevail under any set of facts." Id. at 935. Under the allegations as
plead, the Court was "unable to say, as a matter of law, that there are no possible facts which could
result in CMG's liability for alienation of affections." Id.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has recently determined that the distinction be-
tween an individual and a corporate entity is meaningless in certain constitutional contexts. See Citi-
zens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) ("[T]he Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.").
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IV. THE PERMANENCE OF THE TORT Is DOUBLY AFFIRMED IN 2011
While opposition to the tort still surfaces from time to time, any real
resistance to alienation of affections from the appellate courts is either mi-
nor or nonexistent. Two 2011 cases underscore that the supreme court is
comfortable with alienation of affections and it would be applied as any
other common law tort.
The tort survived two major litigation campaigns for its abolition-the
first in 1999,76 and the second in 2007.71 Neither challenge was serious,
with only one member of each court fully advocating for the abolition of
the tort.
In 1999, Bland garnered a concurrence in part, dissent in part from
Justice Charles R. "Chuck" McRae, and Fitch featured a special concur-
rence by Justice Jess H. Dickinson. The striking eloquence of both sepa-
rate opinions is one reason both are still actively discussed today. Justice
McRae's grand "CIP/DIP" quoted both the Bible and seventeenth century
literature, and expressed his concern that the tort could be used for extor-
tion and blackmail." Justice Dickinson grappled with the entire United
States' jurisprudence regarding the tort, and expressed his great concern
that the doctrine was rooted in a misogynistic "wife-as-chattel" premise.79
Despite the rhetorical power of these separate opinions, neither opin-
ion gathered significant support from the other members of the court; Jus-
tice McRae was alone in dissent, while Justice Dickinson was only joined in
part by another member of the court. Taking the unpopularity of these two
desires to abolish the tort, alienation of affection is safe from court
interference.80
76. See Blqnd, 735 So. 2d at 421.
77. See Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1020.
78. Bland, 735 So. 2d at 426 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1031-32 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring).
80. At least one commentator has also urged the abolition of the tort, primarily based on argu-
ments advanced by Justices McRae and Dickinson. See Jamie Heard, Comment, The National Trend of
Abolishing Actions for the Alienation of a Spouse's Affection and Mississippi's Refusal to Follow Suit, 28
Miss. C. L. REv. 313 (2009).
In arguing for abolition of the tort, the author makes the somewhat unusual declaration that
"[w]hile to abolish the tort of alienation of affection would leave an injured spouse without a means of
redress for the wrongful interference with his or her marriage, one must question the extent that such
injuries can be adequately compensated by a monetary award." Id. at 334. Such "logic" is strained at
best. The author seems to argue that because the tort cannot accurately or completely compensate for
loss, the loss should not be compensated at all. It is not an equitable response to a perceived imbalance
to callously eliminate any cause of action because it is difficult to reduce damages to a monetary
amount. The same can be said of very nearly any tort.
Even taking the comment's wholesale adoption of the McRae and Dickinson opinions to heart-
namely, that alienation of affection is awful messy-this does nothing to address the very real problem
of interference with a marriage from a third party. Alienation of affection may not protect marriages,
but it compensates those who have been harmed. By the same rationale, a statute providing for civil
penalties if a motorist hits a pedestrian may not per se protect pedestrians, and will certainly not pre-
vent an injury, but will certainly assist in compensating the injured pedestrian if the statute is violated.
Nor does the comment address the historical reality that many of the earliest alienation suits were filed
by women.
The comment also argues that the legislature or the courts "should severely limit the amount of
damages potentially recoverable in an alienation action in order to curtail the abuse that the action has
116
LOVE IN VAIN
One 2011 case is clear that the tort will not only continue to exist but
that its roots are growing deeper. In Knight v. Woodfield, a husband filed
suit for alienation against his wife's alleged paramour after gaining access
to her cell phone.s" Records showed the would-be couple had talked over
sixteen hours in two months, sent each other emails, and exchanged 938
text messages-and that the wife had transmitted partially nude photos.
The major challenge to the suit was that the defendant, a Louisiana
resident, claimed "he and [the wife] were never physically together in Mis-
sissippi while she was married . . . ."8 His argument was that his texts,
calls, and emails were not enough minimum contacts to be subject to suit in
Mississippi.8 4
The court vehemently disagreed, and found that the man's "emails,
phone calls, and text messages are sufficient 'minimum contacts' with Mis-
sissippi for the purposes of our personal-jurisdiction analysis."" Impor-
tantly, the court held that "Mississippi has an interest in providing a forum
for its residents who are injured by nonresident defendants."8 6 This "inter-
est is enhanced because Louisiana does not recognize the tort of alienation
of affections, making Mississippi the only viable forum for [the husband's]
claims.""
Knight is a resounding statement of support for the tort of alienation
of affection. Not only will the tort survive in Mississippi under this reason-
ing, but persons from other states and countries would be well-advised to
use caution because the state has a unique interest in protecting the rela-
tionships of its citizens. Knight is also a particularly 21st century invocation
of alienation of affection. While many cases in the modern era have in-
volved adultery or physical contact," Knight emphasizes the broad nature
of the tort to guard against damage to the relationship itself.
Importantly, despite Justice Dickinson's prior opposition to the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the tort in Fitch, he fully signed off on the Knight
opinion which allowed the case to proceed at trial-as did a majority of the
court. While there was a dissent in Knight, it was based on the jurisdic-
tional question, not opposition to the tort itself.
become so susceptible to." Id. The comment does not address any actual "abuses" other than personal
disgust, and certainly does not address why damage to a marriage should suffer uniquely under a cap,
nor the historically low damages awards in reported alienation of affection cases. Juries and the courts
are already well equipped to deal with weak cases-through summary judgment, remittitur, or appeal.
There is also the very real issue that a plaintiff would likely decline to bring a cause of action for
alienation if there was no possibility of recovery. In Mississippi, a state plagued with poverty, bringing
an action solely against an individual certainly poses the risk that there is no "pocket" to satisfy a
damage award, no matter how egregious the harm.
81. Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So. 3d 995, 997 (Miss. 2011).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 997.
84. Id. at 998.
85. Id. at 1000.
86. Id. at 1000-01.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 76.
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Another 2011 case details the lengths to which the court will protect
the tort-and in turn, protect the marriage contract. In Dare v. Stokes, a
husband and wife had divorced, and the property settlement agreement
between the two included a provision that the husband would not bring suit
against any other person for alienation of affection.8 9 After he entered into
that agreement and it was reduced to a final order by the trial court, the
husband learned that his wife had possibly had an affair.9 0 Bound by the
court order, the husband sought for a modification of the agreement. 91 He
also sent a demand letter to his ex-wife's possible lover, one Daniel Dare,
informing him that he was going to file suit for alienation of affection.9 2
The husband requested the chancellor modify the agreement-and the
suspected lover moved to intervene.93 If the provision remained in the
court-approved settlement, the alienation suit would be barred. If it were
modified, then the husband could sue Dare. Despite this risk, "[t]he chan-
cellor found that Dare did not have a legally protected interest in [the]
divorce," and denied his petition to intervene.94
The court ruled that since 1928 it had not allowed third parties to in-
tervene in divorces, which were only for the "exclusive use" of the par-
ties.95 Applying this rule, the court determined that the property
settlement agreement was only for the former husband and wife-not any
third parties.96 As a result, Dare did not have standing to challenge the
modification of the divorce.
In a particularly hostile bit of dicta, the en banc court held that "given
Dare's attempt to intermeddle in the divorce proceedings, after having
meddled with the marital relationship . .. justice hardly 'demands interven-
tion' by Dare." 98
In dissent, Justice Kitchens protested that if any third party should
ever be allowed to intervene in a divorce action, it was one who might end
up on the wrong end of an alienation of affection suit.99 The former prose-
cutor reasoned that "[m]ost divorce cases do not seriously implicate the
interests of strangers to the marriage," and that there was really "no onto-
logical distinction that separates a domestic dispute from other equitable
matters before a trial court." 100 For that reason he would have allowed
Dare to intervene.
89. Dare v. Stokes, 62 So. 3d 958, 958-59 (Miss. 2011).




94. Id. at 958-59.
95. Id. at 960.
96. Id. at 960-61.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 961 (emphasis added).
99. Id. (Kitchens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Kitchens, J., dissenting).
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Yet Justice Kitchens was alone in dissent; the rest of the court was
content to let Dare face the heat of an alienation suit after having "med-
dled" in the marriage. Coupled with Knight's expansive view of minimum
contacts, Dare shows that alienation of affections is firmly entrenched in
Mississippi jurisprudence.
In light of the double affirmations of Knight and Dare in 2011, there is
no serious concern that alienation of affection will be abolished by the su-
preme court as it is currently composed. The legislature could affirmatively
act to eliminate or curtail the tort, but such a challenge would likely only
come within the context of broader restrictions on other torts.
V. ALIENATION OF AFFECTION SUITS ARE NOT INHERENTLY
GENDER BIASED
An overview of reported alienation cases shows that the common law
tort protects the rights of women as well as men. While Justice Dickinson
worried in his separate opinion in Fitch that alienation of affection was
rooted in repressive and patriarchal beliefs,"' 1 longstanding precedent and
one recent unreported trial case shows the strength of the tort in protecting
the economic interests of women.
As set out above, the very first reported alienation case, Tucker v.
Tucker, involved a woman attempting to protect her marriage.' 0 2 Like-
wise, Sivley v. Sivley involved a young woman using the tort as security for
her marriage. 103 All six of the "family intrusion" cases feature a female
plaintiff.'04 Additionally, three of the reported cases involving physical in-
teraction or adultery were filed by female plaintiffs-Carr, Kirk, and Stan-
ton, the last of which was reported in 1932. Indeed, nearly all of the
reported alienation of affection cases prior to 1969 featured women as
plaintiffs. Conversely, nearly all the recent reported alienation cases in-
volve men as plaintiffs.
Contrary to the concerns of the Fitch special concurrence, there is sim-
ply no statistical data to suggest that alienation of affection suits are not as
available to women as to men. In reality, a review of the cases reaches the
opposite conclusion.' 05 One recent high-profile case further demonstrates
that alienation of affection cases can act to protect a woman's contract with
a man as well as a man's with a woman.
Charles "Chip" Pickering, Jr., was a former Republican Congressman
from Mississippi, and shortly after college he married his wife Leisha in
101. See Fitch, 959 So. 2d at 1031-32 (Dickinson, J., specially concurring).
102. See supra notes 47-52.
103. See supra notes 59-61.
104. See supra note 73.
105. Of course, there is the very real socioeconomic possibility that the majority of modern suits
are brought by men against men because there is a "pocket" to compensate the loss. The earning
capacity of women in our society is still lower than that of males, which might account for a statistical
difference in more males filing alienation suits. Yet that does not account for the overwhelming per-
centage of female plaintiffs in pre-1969 alienation suits. One reason might be the possibly lower costs
of maintaining suit in Mississippi at those times.
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1988.106 She was a full-time caregiver to their five children. The couple
began the process of divorce in 2008, but Leisha also filed a civil suit
against a woman named Elizabeth Creekmore Byrd. She alleged that Byrd
and her husband had a relationship in college, which resumed when Picker-
ing was a Congressman in Washington, D.C.
Specifically, Leisha alleged that her husband had carried on an affair
while he was living in the so-called "C Street" Complex, a haven for relig-
ious conservatives in Congress.'o7 In her complaint, Leisha hinted that the
affair had gone on for years, and that Byrd had actually compelled Con-
gressman Pickering to turn down an appointment to serve as a U.S. Senator
from Mississippi. After Pickering retired from Congress, Leisha alleged
that Byrd obtained him a job lobbying on behalf of her family's business
interests.
The suit made national news."os While it never made its way to either
trial or the appellate courts, it was a grand example of how the tort
uniquely works to protects the interests of women as well as men-as it has
since its first reported case 115 years ago.
VI. EMERGING DEFENSES TO THE MODERN TORT
The primary legal defense to alienation in past years has been both
ambitious and simplistic: that the tort itself should be abolished. As dis-
cussed above, the supreme court has signaled that the tort has a permanent
home in Mississippi. Practitioners do not defend negligence suits with the
idea of abolition of the doctrine itself. Instead of consuming the resources
of the parties and the courts arguing for outright abolition, creative liti-
gators should instead focus on inventive approaches to the tort.
Two recent cases highlight strategies which could preempt a meritori-
ous alienation case due to procedural flaws. Above all, litigators should be
cautious that the language in a divorce order can preclude or damage a
later claim for alienation.
The Dare case hints that prior court orders could bar a subsequent
alienation suit. Divorces are creatures of the legal system,1 09 and a divorce
order is still a final order under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 Final Judg-
ments of Divorce often contain a property settlement agreement, or PSA,
106. See Complaint for Plaintiff, Pickering v. Byrd, No. 251-09-595 (Hinds Cnty. Cir. Ct.). The
details in this section are culled from this pleading, which is publicly available. It is perhaps notable
that former Justice McRae, the lone dissenter in Bland, originally represented Mrs. Pickering in her
case.
107. Jessica Brady & Jackie Kucinich, Intrigue Grows Over C Street, ROLL CALL, 2009 WLNR
13833387 (July 20, 2009).
108. See generally John Bresnahan, Chip Pickering's Wife Sues Alleged Mistress, http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/250 6 7 .html (July 16, 2009); ROLL CALL, supra note 107; Gail Col-
lins, The Fellowship Quiz, NEW YORK TIMEs, 2009 WLNR 13726019 (July 18, 2009); Jimmie Gates, Ex-
Lawmaker's Wife Sues Alleged Mistress, CLARION-LEDGER, (July 17, 2009).
109. See supra notes 7-13.
110. Specifically, Miss. R. Civ. P. 54, 58.
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which is negotiated by the parties and approved by the court-and the is-
sue at the core of Dare. These PSAs might include language barring alien-
ation suits, and many stipulate that the divorce "was not the result of undue
influence exercised by any other person(s) upon the other," or other simi-
lar boilerplate language.
Yet once submitted to a chancellor and approved, the PSAs are incor-
porated into a final judgment, and are therefore binding orders.' 1' A liti-
gant, like an attorney, "may not pick and choose which cotrt orders to
obey."112 If a husband signs a PSA which is later incorporated into a final
judgment, a defendant could certainly argue that it preempted or barred
later suit against a third party. This is exactly why the alleged lover in Dare
fought so hard to intervene in the modification proceeding.
In a recent court of appeals case, a litigant argued a similar defense-
namely, that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred an alienation case af-
ter a divorce.' t 3 The court held in Wood v. Cooley that for judicial estoppel
to apply, a contrary position must be asserted by the same party in the
same litigation." 4 In this alienation case, the alleged paramour was not
party to the prior divorce action, "and the current case was not the same
litigation as was in the divorce proceeding.""' As a result, judicial estop-
pel did not apply.'1 6
While judicial estoppel did not apply in Wood, "[tihe rule of issue pre-
clusion, or collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues that were actually
litigated and decided in a previous action."" 7 While not argued in that
case, and therefore not reached by the court of appeals, one could argue
that the issues in the alienation case were already litigated in the prior
chancery case. This is especially true for many divorces based on irrecon-
cilable differences, where the parties often stipulate that it is impossible to
reconcile, and that no third party caused the marriage to end. While that
boilerplate language is common in a divorce, it could derail a potential
alienation suit. While it is clear that judicial estoppel will not apply, its
cousin, issue preclusion, might be applicable in alienation suits.
Other equitable doctrines might also bar suit. For instance, while no
cases have ruled on the point, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is
clear that it binds both lawyers and litigants."'s In many divorces, a veri-
fied complaint for divorce is signed by the parties, not their lawyers-in-
deed, Rule 11 requires that "[a] party who is not represented by attorney
shall sign that party's pleading or motion and state the party's address." As
111. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Court orders have to be
obeyed until they are reversed or set aside in an orderly fashion.").
112. In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949, 959 (Miss. 2006).
113. Wood v. Cooley, 78 So. 3d 920, 926-27 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
114. Id. at 927.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1200 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
118. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (sanctions can be assessed against "a party, or his attorney, or
both").
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the comment to that Rule notes, "[A] signed pleading may be introduced
into evidence in another action by an adverse party as proof of the facts
alleged therein."11 9 Again using Dare as an example, if a litigant has signed
a divorce complaint or other pleading which has stipulated that no third
party harmed the marriage, or that she will not proceed with suit against a
third party, an alienation suit might be barred. A defendant could seek to
have the later-filed pleadings struck as a violation of Rule 11.
By that same reasoning, the maxim of "clean hands" might also apply
if there is a willful violation of Rule 11. That doctrine prescribes that "no
person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court . . . when his
conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized
by willful inequity."' 20 In such situations "the doors of the court will be
shut against him in limine," at the very threshold "the court will refuse to
interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any
remedy."121
If a litigant has previously filed pleadings which affirm that no third
party harmed the marriage, or entered into a PSA which bars later suits
against third persons, later suits could be prohibited through collateral es-
toppel, prior court order, Rule 11, or the doctrine of unclean hands. Liti-
gators on both sides of the Bar should be cautious in scrutinizing divorce
documents before filing or answering any suit for alienation of affection.
VII. THE FUTURE OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTION
Alienation of affection has endured in Mississippi for well over a cen-
tury and survived two major attempts in the appellate courts to abolish it.
Recent rulings from the supreme court emphasize the permanence of the
tort even as methods of communication shift in the 21st century.122
The true challenges facing the Bench and Bar at this point are practi-
cal, not philosophical. While the Knight court ruled that about 1,000 texts
satisfied minimum contacts for the state to have jurisdiction, would 500, or
even 100 texts suffice? While Knight allowed a Louisiana man to be sub-
ject to suit for alienation one state away, would it allow a Canadian to be
sued by a Mississippian?123 Although the courts have been careful to re-
peatedly emphasize that alienation suits protect marriage from all third
party interference, a "family intrusion" case has not reared its head in a
reported case since the 1960s, and it would be interesting to see how the
119. Miss. R. Civ. P. 11, Comment (emphasis added).
120. Brennan v. Brennan, 605 So. 2d 749, 752 (Miss. 1992) (quoting V.A. Griffith, Mississippi
Chancery Practice § 42 (2d ed. 1950)).
121. Id. (quoting 1 POMEROY's EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 397, 738 (4th ed.).
122. However, what real difference is there between the several hundred texts and emails in
2011's Knight and the several hundred letters and telegrams of 1932's Stanton, discussed supra note 73?
123. In Boyd v. McFarlane, No. 3:09cv257-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Apr. 22, 2010), a McComb
resident filed suit against a resident of Winnipeg, Canada, who had never been to Mississippi. As co-
counsel for the defendant, the author of this article argued that the suit was inconvenient and the
defendant was not subject to Mississippi's law, but these arguments were made prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Knight.
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courts and jury system would respond to one today. Just as difficult to
determine is how one should assess valuation of an alienation case.
While some may question how well it reimburses harm, or whether the
tort does damage itself in trying to compensate loss, there is no question
that alienation of affection serves a historically valid purpose in Missis-
sippi's jurisprudence. The state has long sought to protect marriage. Once
a marriage is damaged by a third party it may be over, just as a pedestrian
hit by a car may suffer terminal injuries. Alienation suits play a unique role
in American law in compensating injured spouses and safeguarding mar-
riages. The real question is not why Mississippi is one of the few states that
have the tort of alienation of affection, but why the rest of the states refuse
to recognize the tort.

